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IF IT QUACKS LIKE A DUCK: REVIEWING
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS’ SPEECH
RESTRICTIONS UNDER THE FIRST PRONG
OF CENTRAL HUDSON
SHAWN L. FULTZ
The First Amendment protects the speech of health care providers. This
protection can limit states’ abilities to protect patients from harmful therapies
involving speech, such as sexual orientation change efforts. Because
providers’ speech is more similar to commercial speech than traditional
political discourse, it is possible to create a First Amendment review analysis
that better balances states’ police powers with providers’ First Amendment
rights. Under a “single-prong” approach, the first prong of Central Hudson
can be used to identify quackery, which is analogous to false or misleading
commercial speech and would therefore be outside the protection of the First
Amendment. Because health care must be tailored to individual patients,
restrictions on speech that survive the first prong of Central Hudson would be
subject to strict scrutiny in order to leave the therapeutic decision to the provider
and her patient, and maintain consistency with current jurisprudence.
This Comment examines litigation from California’s attempted ban on
sexual orientation change therapy to illustrate the conflicts created by the
current approach to First Amendment review of health care provider speech.
This Comment then demonstrates the benefit of the proposed single-prong
approach, including how it simultaneously protects patients from harm while
protecting health care providers’ speech.

 J.D. Candidate, May 2015, American University Washington College of Law,
M.P.H. Behavioral and Community Health Sciences, May 2000, University of Pittsburgh
Graduate School of Public Health, M.D., May 1997, University of Pittsburgh School of
Medicine, B.S. Premedicine, May 1993, Pennsylvania State University. Thanks to Jarred
Reiling, Randolph Kline, and Professor Jamin Raskin for listening to early versions of
my thesis, identifying gaps, and pushing me towards a more coherent argument.
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“I felt dirty about [my homosexual orientation]. I felt like a cancer
with a boil that someone is trying to lance out. I felt and still feel like
a failure. . . . The counseling helped for a while but after that it
reinforced the self-loathing and internalized homophobia. . . . It
increased my self-loathing greatly.”1
“These practices have no basis in science or medicine and they will
now be relegated to the dustbin of quackery . . . .”2

1. Ariel Shidlo & Michael Schroeder, Changing Sexual Orientation: A Consumers’
Report, 33 PROF’L PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 249, 254 (2002) (alterations in original)
(quoting one client who had undergone conversion therapy).
2. See Wyatt Buchanan, State Bans Gay-Repair Therapy for Minors, S.F. GATE, Sept.
29, 2012, http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/State-bans-gay-repair-therapy-forminors-3906032.php (quoting California Governor Jerry Brown’s statement to the
San Francisco Chronicle on signing Senate Bill 1172 banning conversion therapy).

FULTZ.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

1/9/2014 3:46 PM

IF IT QUACKS LIKE A DUCK

569

INTRODUCTION
Conversion therapy, a type of sexual orientation change therapy,3
refers to talk therapy directed at changing the sexual orientation of
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer (LGBTQ) clients to a
heterosexual orientation. A procedure advocated for largely by
conservative religious branches,4 scientific evidence demonstrates it
to be harmful as well as ineffective at changing an individual’s sexual
orientation.5 These concerns prompted California to enact Senate
Bill 1172 (“SB 1172”),6 making it unprofessional conduct for mental
health providers to try to change the sexual orientation of LGBTQ
youth.7 This statute was immediately challenged in two separate suits
on grounds that it restricted providers’ freedom of speech.8 Both
cases were appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit after judges in the same district court issued conflicting
opinions: a preliminary injunction against SB 1172 was issued in
Welch v. Brown,9 but not in Pickup v. Brown,10 decided a day later.
The different outcomes in the district court cases resulted
primarily from whether SB 1172 was considered a content-based
restriction on health care providers’ speech requiring strict scrutiny,
as in Welch,11 or as a restriction on professional conduct subject to
rational basis review, as in Pickup.12 The Ninth Circuit, in a
consolidated appeal, held that SB 1172 regulated professional
conduct and not speech and was therefore only subject to rational

3. See Karolyn Ann Hicks, Comment, “Reparative” Therapy: Whether Parental
Attempts To Change a Child’s Sexual Orientation Can Legally Constitute Child Abuse, 49 AM.
U. L. REV. 506, 515 (1999) (discussing other approaches to changing sexual
orientation, such as electrical shock therapy, chemical aversive therapy, and
hormone therapy).
4. See Buchanan, supra note 2 (stating that proponents of the controversial
therapy are often religious, prompting gay rights activists to refer to the therapy as an
attempt to “pray away the gay”).
5. See infra Part I.D.
6. 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 835 (codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865 (West 2013)).
7. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.2. The statute only addressed sexual
orientation change efforts targeted at minors in order to protect this vulnerable
group from this dangerous therapy. Id. § 865.1.
8. Complaint, Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465,
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012) (No. 2:12-CV-02497), 2012 WL 5981507; Complaint for
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, (E.D. Cal.
2012) (No. CIV. 212-2484), 2012 WL 4762008.
9. Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d sub nom.
Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013).
10. Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465 (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 4, 2012), aff’d, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013).
11. Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1109, 1111.
12. Pickup, 2012 WL 6021465, at *9.
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basis review.13 In part because this distinction between conduct and
speech is often dispositive, this Comment advocates for a new
approach to First Amendment review of laws affecting health care
providers’ speech. It argues that the First Amendment does not bar
states from protecting their citizens from quackery—health care
practices that lack scientific support.14 By applying a similar
approach to what the Supreme Court uses to justify a lesser level of
First Amendment protection for commercial speech, this Comment
demonstrates that courts can weed out quackery while protecting
legitimate health care speech. By first determining whether the
restricted speech is analogous to truthful and non-misleading
commercial speech before applying strict scrutiny, courts will be able to
use this “single-prong” approach to protect freedom of speech while also
balancing the states’ interest in preventing harm to citizens.
Part I explains the states’ role in regulating health care and
explores the current approach to First Amendment protection of
speech. This exploration focuses on health care providers and the
commercial speech doctrine. This part also introduces conversion
therapy and the California statute, SB 1172.
Part II demonstrates that under the current approach, the
California statute is likely to be ruled unconstitutional if considered a
restriction on speech—a prototypical example of the flaws that exist
with the current approach. Thereafter, it fashions an approach that
both protects freedom of speech and patients by applying to the
health care field the reasoning and concepts the Supreme Court has
used in connection to commercial speech. Applying the first prong
of the test articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York,15—determining whether the restricted
speech is truthful and non-misleading—and then applying strict
scrutiny, will enable courts to weed out quackery. Subsequently, this
Part argues that SB 1172 would be a constitutional restriction on speech
under this proposed single-prong approach. Finally, this Comment
concludes that the proposed single-prong approach provides sufficient
protection for this special category of speech without trampling the
states’ interest in protecting their citizens from harm.

13. Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1056. The decision ultimately reversed the District Court
in Welch v. Brown but upheld Pickup v. Brown.
14. For a larger discussion of the definition of quackery, see Stephen Barrett,
Quackery: How Should It Be Defined?, QUACKWATCH, http://www.quackwatch.org/01
QuackeryRelatedTopics/quackdef.html (last updated Jan. 17, 2009).
15. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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BACKGROUND

While much of health care is regulated through the federal
government’s commerce and spending powers,16 this Comment
focuses on state-level regulations of health care providers. This Part
explains the role of states in the regulation of health care to
protect individuals from harm, as well as the role of the First
Amendment in commercial speech and in the health care setting.
Finally, this Part discusses conversion therapy, California’s attempt
at banning sexual orientation change therapies through SB 1172,
and the related legal challenges.
A. States Regulate Health Care Under Their Police Powers
The states’ police powers provide the authority to enact and
enforce measures to protect the health, safety, and well-being of their
citizens.17 States have a long history of using this power to regulate
medicine in order to protect the public.18 States have used this police
power to regulate professions, including health care, predominately
through licensure.19 In Watson v. Maryland,20 decided in 1910, the
Supreme Court recognized the states’ interest in regulating health
care.21 In affirming a conviction for practicing medicine without a
license, the Court noted that regulating a profession for the
protection of the public health was a valid exercise of state police
powers.22 States can require training and set specific educational
standards as conditions for licensure.23 This control over the

16. See generally Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v.
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 703–06 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (detailing the history of drug
regulation in the United States, culminating in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
of 1938 and subsequent amendments). Only when “interstate commerce began
its great expansion after the Civil War did the need for Federal rule-making
become widely realized.” Id. at 704; see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243,
250–51 (2006) (discussing the federal regulation of medications under the
Controlled Substances Act).
17. 39 AM. JUR. 2D Health § 1 (2012); see also 39A C.J.S. Health and Environment § 1
(2012) (“[T]here is no public policy more important than the protection of citizens
from practices which may injure their health.”).
18. See, e.g., Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910) (recognizing the wellsettled principle that states historically have had the power to regulate the health
profession); Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (D.D.C. 2001)
(discussing states’ authority to regulate speech within the doctor-patient relationship
(citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 n.30 (1977))).
19. 53 C.J.S. Licenses § 8 (2012).
20. 218 U.S. 173.
21. See id. at 176 (noting that “[d]ealing . . . with the lives and health of the
people” justifies states’ involvement in regulating the health profession).
22. Id. at 178.
23. 53 C.J.S. Licenses, supra note 19, § 8.
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educational and training requirements determines who can enter a
profession and allows the state to prevent harm to its citizens.24
In addition to controlling who can enter a profession, states’ police
powers allow restrictions on licensed professionals when necessary to
protect the welfare and safety of society.25 In 1935, in Semler v. Oregon
State Board of Dental Examiners,26 the Supreme Court upheld state
sanctions against a dentist for advertising.27 The Court noted that
states’ authority to regulate the medical profession through licensing
and licensing boards was “not open to dispute.”28 The Court further
held that ensuring the competence of individual dentists as well as
protecting the public from being “prey[ed] upon . . . through
alluring promises of physical relief” was within the state’s authority.29
Ten years later, Justice Jackson, in his concurrence to the Court’s
reversal of a contempt conviction in Thomas v. Collins,30 articulated
that state licensing authority allowed the state to protect citizens from
incompetent professionals.31
State licensing authority covers a wide range of health care
professions. For example, in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,
Inc.,32 the Court upheld restrictions on opticians as within the state’s
power, despite opticians’ tangential impact on health.33 Likewise, in
National Ass’n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. California Board of
Psychology,34 the Ninth Circuit upheld a challenge to the licensing of
psychoanalysts who only practiced talk therapy—finding licensing
within the state’s authority.35 The court also held that state licensure

24. See id. § 1 (explaining that engaging in an activity without a license would
be illegal).
25. See, e.g., Albany Surgical, P.C. v. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 572 S.E.2d 638, 642–
43 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (noting the test for reasonableness of restrictions is the
impact upon the professional and the public).
26. 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
27. Id. at 609, 611, 613. At this time, the Court did not recognize First
Amendment protection of advertising; First Amendment protection of advertising
did not develop until 1976. See infra Part I.C.
28. Semler, 294 U.S. at 611.
29. Id. at 612; see also Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910) (stating that
it is well established that states’ police powers extend to the regulation of certain
professions, “particularly those which closely concern the public health”); cf. Linder
v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (recognizing that control of the medical
practice is a state power rather than a federal power).
30. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
31. Id. at 545 (Jackson, J., concurring).
32. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
33. See id. at 490 (explaining that because eyeglass frames are used in
conjunction with lenses which pertain to vision, selling such frames enters the “field
of health”).
34. 228 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2000).
35. Id. at 1054.
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did not violate the psychoanalysts’ First Amendment rights.36 The
court noted that the licensing laws did not restrict the content of
therapy, or the therapeutic modalities used, and were therefore
content neutral.37
In addition to licensure provisions, the state also has responsibility
for determining professional standards.38 These standards are usually
set through the state licensing authority within each profession.39 For
health care, those standards must be “grounded in the methods and
procedures of science.”40 When a professional violates the standards,
the licensing authority can impose sanctions such as suspending or
revoking a license in order to protect public health and safety.41
Courts have upheld the compelling interest in protecting the quality
of health care.42 Like the licensing provisions that can prevent an
incompetent provider from entering the profession, sanctioning
providers who have violated professional standards may prevent
future harm. However, the sanctions usually come after at least some
harm has already occurred to a client or patient.43
Aside from regulating professionals through licensure and
professional standards, courts have recognized the role of states in
directly regulating medical practice. For example, in Oregon v.
Ashcroft,44 the Ninth Circuit upheld an injunction preventing the U.S.
Attorney General from enforcing an interpretative federal rule
stating that physicians who assisted suicides consistent with state law

36. See id. (noting that speech used to treat patients received some First
Amendment protection but was not “immune from regulation”).
37. See id. at 1055–56 (explaining additionally that no speech is being suppressed
because of its message).
38. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978) (noting the
state’s strong interests in regulating the conduct of lawyers (citing Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955))).
39. See, e.g., Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 611 (1935)
(reciting the well-accepted proposition that a state may regulate certain professional
requirements, such as requiring licenses or establishing an administrative board).
40. Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 380 (Mont. 1999) (explaining that the
legislature has “no interest, much less a compelling one” in prohibiting a medical
practice the medical authority has deemed without risk).
41. 53 C.J.S. Licenses, supra note 19, § 82 (discussing a states’ discretionary power
to impose sanctions through licensing authorities).
42. See, e.g., Caddy v. State, 764 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(declaring the State’s compelling interest in “protecting the mental health of its
citizens” and “protecting the integrity of the medical profession”).
43. Another approach to protecting the quality of health care that is only
applicable after the harm has occurred is tort law. See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY,
EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE
MODERN STATE 53 (2012) (stating that malpractice is one “vehicle for law to
incorporate and enforce pertinent disciplinary standards”).
44. 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243 (2006).
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were in violation of the Controlled Substance Act.45 The court
explained that physician-assisted suicide is a medical practice that is
appropriately regulated by the state.46 The court stated that the
principle of federalism requires state, not federal, direct control over
medicine.47 In affirming the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court in
Gonzales v. Oregon48 reiterated that the principle of federalism gives
states “great latitude” in protecting their citizens.49 Both federalism
and the police powers of licensure and professional standards
provide states with multiple tools to regulate health care.
B. Health Care Providers’ Speech Is Protected by the First Amendment
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the
government from restricting the freedom of speech.50 However, the
Supreme Court has not interpreted this as a blanket prohibition on
speech restrictions and treats various types of speech differently. For
example, truthful speech proposing a commercial transaction
receives an intermediate level of scrutiny.51 On the other hand, strict
scrutiny is applied when examining the constitutionality of a
restriction on an individual’s speech, often considered potential
political speech, requiring that any restriction be narrowly tailored
and further a compelling government interest.52 This section
discusses the role of the First Amendment in protecting health care
providers’ speech. Courts treat speech that occurs between a health
care provider and a patient in the course of providing professional
services like the speech of individuals.
In relation to individuals’ speech, government restrictions based
on content or viewpoint are rarely constitutional; it is well established

45. Id. at 1120 (referring to the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 801–904 (2000)).
46. See id. at 1126 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), a case
in which the Supreme Court refused to find a liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause in committing suicide and, as such, a state ban on assisted suicide was
upheld as being rationally related to a government interest).
47. See id. at 1124 (“The Supreme Court has made the constitutional principle
clear . . . .”).
48. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
49. Id. at 270 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also noted
Congressional affirmation of the principle that regulation of medical practice is
under state authority when it drafted the Controlled Substances Act’s preemption
provision. Id. at 270–71.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
51. See infra Part I.C.
52. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 530, 532, 540 (1980) (applying strict scrutiny to a regulation that forbids
privately owned public utility companies from including political inserts in its
customers’ bills).

FULTZ.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

IF IT QUACKS LIKE A DUCK

1/9/2014 3:46 PM

575

that the government cannot restrict speech because of its message.53
The Supreme Court has even described the prohibition on
government restriction of speech because of its content as
“axiomatic.”54 For example, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
University of Virginia,55 the Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of the university’s refusal to reimburse a student
organization for publication of a newspaper because of the
newspaper’s religious nature.56
The Court found this refusal
constituted a viewpoint-based restriction because the university
reimbursed publications that discussed religion as a subject but not
publications that were religiously oriented.57 The Court held that the
university’s withholding of funds to the student organization violated
the students’ freedom of speech.58 It also noted that restrictions that
target a particular viewpoint are “presumed to be unconstitutional.”59
In general, the government cannot restrict speech based on the
opinion or perspective of the speaker.60 On the other hand,
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech are
permissible,61 provided they are narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate
state interest.62
Despite this general rule, the government may have some leeway in
regulating speech that is “incidental to the conduct of [a]
profession.”63 Justice White defined a professional as someone who
serves an individual client by exercising judgment on that client’s
behalf.64 The individual relationship between the professional and
that individual client is what permits regulation of professional
speech.65 Without this relationship, the speech could not be

53. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (distinguishing
between regulations that restrict activity because of its message and regulations that
limit the “time, place and manner”).
54. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995)
(citing Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)).
55. 515 U.S. 819.
56. Id. at 822–23.
57. Id. at 831.
58. Id. at 837.
59. Id. at 828 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–43 (1994)).
60. See id. at 829 (finding that settled principles of law “provide [a] framework
forbidding the State to exercise viewpoint discrimination”).
61. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (giving the example
that the government could prevent two parades from marching at the same time).
62. See id. at 116–17 (“The crucial question is whether the manner of
expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place
at a particular time.”).
63. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in judgment).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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regulated as “incidental” to the professional conduct and would be
subject to full First Amendment protection.66
Despite this potential leeway, most attempts at restricting health
care providers’ speech have not survived constitutional challenge. In
1945, Justice Jackson’s concurrence first discussed the protection of
health care providers’ speech in Thomas v. Collins,67 where the Court
overturned a contempt conviction.68 Justice Jackson noted that while
states could use their licensing authority to limit who could enter a
profession, they could not limit what those people said in their
professional capacity.69 Nevertheless, legislatures have repeatedly
tried to regulate health care provider speech on certain controversial
topics where there is legitimate scientific debate, including the
medicinal use of marijuana, firearms, and abortion.70 While courts
have often upheld restrictions on health care provider speech related
to abortion, they have not taken the same approach with speech on
the other topics.
1.

Medical marijuana
In 1996, in response to the legalization of medical marijuana in
Arizona and California, the federal government issued a policy
stating that physicians “recommending or prescribing” medical
marijuana would lose their authority to prescribe controlled
substances.71 This policy was challenged on First Amendment
grounds in federal courts in both the District of Columbia and
California, and concluded with different outcomes.
In Pearson v. McCaffrey,72 the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia upheld the federal policy as not infringing on physicians’
First Amendment right to freedom of speech.73 The court ruled that
this was not a content-based speech restriction because physicians
were free to discuss the benefits of medical marijuana with patients.74
66. Id.; see also infra notes 240–241 and accompanying text.
67. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
68. See id. at 540 (determining that the lower court’s contempt order was
inappropriate because the Texas statute that the petitioner had allegedly violated was
applied in a way that impermissibly restrained free speech and assembly).
69. Id. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[B]ut I do not think it could make it a
crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons to follow or reject any school of
medical thought.”).
70. The importance of this fact will be addressed in Part II.B infra.
71. BARRY R. MCCAFFREY, OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, THE
ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE TO THE PASSAGE OF CALIFORNIA PROPOSITION 215 AND ARIZONA
PROPOSITION 200 (1996), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/215rel.txt.
72. 139 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2001).
73. Id. at 116, 119–22, 125.
74. See id. at 120 (relying on the government’s position during oral arguments
that federal law did not prohibit discussing medical marijuana).
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The court found the act of recommending was conduct akin to
prescribing because, under the law of some states, a physician’s
recommendation could be used to purchase medical marijuana.75
The court further justified the distinction between speech discussing
the benefits of marijuana use and the act of recommending
marijuana by pointing to the long history of state regulation of
medicine,76 the state’s authority to reasonably regulate speech that is
part of the practice of medicine,77 and the lack of First Amendment
protection for speech used to commit a crime.78
In Conant v. McCaffrey,79 the district court issued a permanent
injunction against the federal government’s policy80 reasoning that a
physician’s recommendation to use marijuana could potentially result
in the patient petitioning the government to legalize marijuana.81
The court also noted the importance of protecting patients’ ability to
participate in the “marketplace of ideas,” including discussions about
the regulation of marijuana.82 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
in Conant v. Walters.83 In addition to reiterating the First Amendment
analysis, the appellate court also stressed the importance of open
communication between patients and physicians.84 Rather than using
a history of state regulation to justify restrictions, the Ninth Circuit
instead stated “professional speech may be entitled to ‘the strongest
protection our Constitution has to offer.’”85
2.

Firearms
In 2011, a group of physicians challenged Florida’s Firearm
Owners’ Privacy Act, a law restricting physicians’ ability to inquire

75. Id. at 120–21.
76. Id. at 121 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 n.30 (1977)).
77. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)
(plurality opinion)).
78. See id. (summarizing cases that hold that the First Amendment is not a
criminal defense). Despite the state law authorizing use of medical marijuana, its use
is still a federal crime under the Controlled Substances Act. Id.
79. No. C 97-00139 WHA, 2000 WL 1281174 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2000), aff’d sub
nom. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002).
80. Id. at *16.
81. See id. at *14–15 (describing several doctor recommendations that could lead
to a legitimate response including enrolling in an experimental trial or traveling to a
country where marijuana use is legal).
82. See id. at *14 (explaining how restricting the capability of a doctor to
communicate with a patient about medical marijuana prevented the patient from
participating in the public discourse on the subject).
83. 309 F.3d 629, 639 (9th Cir. 2002).
84. See id. at 636 (referencing the doctor-patient privilege recognized in the
Federal Rules of Evidence).
85. Id. at 637 (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995)).

FULTZ.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1/9/2014 3:46 PM

578

[Vol. 63:567

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

about ownership of firearms.86 The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida rejected the state’s argument that the law
protected the Second Amendment rights of gun owners.87 Instead,
the court’s decision focused on the law’s impact on the free speech
rights of health care providers.88 In granting the preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the relevant act, the court
identified the value of not restricting speech within the doctorpatient relationship.89
When later granting the permanent
injunction, Judge Cooke again observed that the restriction was not a
regulation of speech incidental to professional conduct but rather a
restriction on truthful, non-misleading speech.90
Because the
Supreme Court had applied strict scrutiny in Sorrell v. IMS Health,
Inc.91 to evaluate a content-based restriction on pharmaceutical
companies’ commercial speech, the district court had applied strict
scrutiny to the Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act at the preliminary
injunction stage.92 Judge Cooke went on to state that the level of
scrutiny to apply to professional speech is “an unsettled question of
law.”93 However, in that case the level of scrutiny did not matter
because the Florida law failed under either level of scrutiny because
the state had not demonstrated a problem that needed to be
addressed and because the statute did not address the type of
problem postulated.94
3.

Abortion
A larger area of case law exploring the First Amendment
protection of health care providers’ speech is in regard to abortion.
86. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
87. Id. at 1374 (holding that the Second Amendment right to “keep arms” was
categorically distinct from the rights at issue in Florida’s Firearm Owner’s Privacy Act
(citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582–83 (2008))).
88. See id. at 1374, 1377–83 (applying strict scrutiny to determine plaintiffs’
likelihood of success on the merits).
89. See id. at 1374 (emphasizing the importance of “the free flow of truthful, nonmisleading information within the doctor-patient relationship” (citing Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51
(1980); Conant, 309 F.3d at 636)).
90. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1262 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
Regulations of speech incidental to professional conduct “govern the access or
practice of a profession; they do not burden or prohibit truthful, non-misleading
speech within the scope of the profession.” Id.
91. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011); see also infra notes 167–175 and accompanying text
(discussing Sorrell).
92. Wollschlaeger, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1262.
93. See id. at 1262–63 (noting that in Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030,
1074 (1991), the Supreme Court held that a lawyer’s speech related to pending cases
could receive less protection than freedom of speech by the press).
94. Id. at 1264–67.
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Here the Supreme Court has been more deferential to state restrictions,
sometimes by reframing the constitutional question so as to avoid
triggering review under the First Amendment, and sometimes by simply
dismissing the argument without significant analysis.95
In Rust v. Sullivan,96 the Supreme Court upheld federal restrictions
on family-planning funds awarded under Title X of the Public Health
Service Act.97 By casting the case as simply a restriction on the
allowable scope of a government-funded project, the Court avoided
addressing whether the restriction violated the physicians’ freedom of
speech.98 Under the statute, health care providers employed under
the Title X program remained free to advocate for, recommend, or
provide abortion services outside the Title X project.99 However, the
Court avoided examining whether the government had committed
viewpoint discrimination by funding one viewpoint but not another.100
Further, the Court has been reluctant to address First Amendment
implications regarding the doctor-patient relationship. The Court
stated that the Title X program did not infringe upon the doctorpatient relationship enough to require addressing whether that
relationship enjoyed First Amendment protection when funded by
the government.101 The Court relied partly on the argument that the
doctor-patient relationship within the Title X program was not
“sufficiently all encompassing” as to replace the traditional doctorpatient relationship.102 In his dissent, Justice Blackmun objected to
imposing restrictions on speech within the doctor-patient
relationship, even when the relationship was limited to
family-planning services.103 In addition to citing the physicians’
ethical responsibility to offer all appropriate therapeutic options,104
he highlighted the “unique relationship of trust” that occurs between

95. See infra notes 96–111 and accompanying text (outlining cases that have
taken these approaches).
96. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
97. Id. at 203 (referring to Pub. L. 91-572, § 6(c), 84 Stat. 1506 (1970) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-6 (2012))).
98. See id. at 194 (“This is not a case of the Government ‘suppressing a dangerous
idea,’ but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its employees from engaging in
activities outside of the project’s scope.”).
99. See id. at 198–99 (differentiating between the employees’ time working on the
project, and their time as private citizens).
100. See id. at 194 (explaining that this might invalidate multiple
governmental programs).
101. Id. at 200.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 213, 218–19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 214 (referencing two medical societies and a presidential
commission).
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patients and doctors.105 He went on to remind the majority of its
previous warnings that speech restrictions on the practice of
medicine “cannot endure.”106
The Supreme Court has also upheld compelled speech related to
abortion. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,107
the Court upheld a provision of a law that required physicians to
provide informed consent as specified by the State.108 The Court
dismissed the physicians’ First Amendment claim against
compelled speech because the impacted speech was “part of the
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the State.”109
The same reasoning was later used by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit to uphold a South Dakota abortion statute
requiring physicians to disclose an increased statistical risk of suicide
and suicide attempts in women who undergo abortions.110 The
Eighth Circuit noted that the First Amendment would protect
individuals from compelled speech, but would not protect physicians
compelled to give “truthful, nonmisleading information,” even if that
information might make a patient choose to forego an abortion.111
The court described this requirement as a valid use of regulatory
authority and not compelled speaking of the “State’s ideological
message.”112 The only way to show the speech violated the First
Amendment would be if it was untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant to
deciding whether to have an abortion.113

105. See id. at 218 (noting that patients put “complete confidence, and often their
very lives, in the hands of” physicians).
106. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
67 n.8 (1976)).
107. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
108. See id. at 881–87 (plurality opinion) (analyzing the informed consent
requirement and determining it was not an undue burden on constitutionally
protected abortion rights).
109. Id. at 884. Other courts have noted the lack of emphasis the Supreme Court
placed on this argument. See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v.
Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The three sentences with which the Court
disposed of the First Amendment claims are, if anything, the antithesis of strict
scrutiny.”); Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Riley, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1269 (M.D.
Ala. 2003) (mentioning the “brief fashion” with which the Supreme Court dismissed
the First Amendment claim).
110. See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 893 (8th
Cir. 2012) (en banc) (finding that, as established by Casey, the state’s “suicide
advisory” rule is subject to “reasonable licensing and regulation by the state”).
111. Id. Interestingly, the court requires more than eleven pages to explain why
the disclosure is truthful and non-misleading. Id. at 893–905.
112. Id. at 893.
113. Id.
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Governmental efforts to restrict health care providers’ speech have
consistently failed strict scrutiny.114 However, for speech related to
abortion, courts have avoided analyzing the health care providers’
speech under the First Amendment or found other ways to uphold
statutes compelling or restricting speech.
C. The Commercial Speech Doctrine
Unlike individuals’ speech, commercial speech has only received
First Amendment protection for approximately forty years.115
Furthermore, it receives less First Amendment protection than noncommercial speech.116 In health care, the commercial speech
doctrine has been applied primarily in the area of advertising.117
The first case to provide First Amendment protection to
commercial speech was the 1976 case Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.118 There, the Court
examined the constitutionality of a Virginia statute that designated
advertising prescription drug prices as unprofessional conduct.119
The Court rejected Virginia’s claim that advertising drug prices
would lead to cost-cutting measures and endanger customers,
deeming the claim “highly paternalistic.”120 The Court went on to
note that the First Amendment prevents the government from
choosing between the “dangers of suppressing information, and the
dangers of its misuse if it is freely available.”121 In saying this, the
Court established that the First Amendment protects commercial
speech because customers can only make the best decisions when
they are well informed.122 At the same time, the Court noted that
114. Except for the medical marijuana cases and Rust v. Sullivan, which involved
federal laws, these cases were challenges to states’ restrictions on speech. The
Supreme Court has not applied the First Amendment differently when restrictions
are based on states’ police powers as compared to federal law.
115. The Court’s earlier approach to commercial speech failed to provide any
First Amendment protection whatsoever. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52,
54–55 (1942) (“We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint
on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”).
116. See infra notes 125–135 and accompanying text (detailing the current First
Amendment commercial speech doctrine).
117. In fact, the most recent pronouncement from the Court in the realm of
commercial speech came in the health care field, in which the Court struck down a
Vermont statute restricting the sale, disclosure and use of pharmacy records for
marketing purposes. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
118. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
119. Id. at 752–54.
120. Id. at 770.
121. Id.
122. See id. (explaining that by providing open access to non-harmful
information, people will then have the necessary information they need to
pursue their own best interests).
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commercial speech could be regulated through time, place, and
manner restrictions and likely could be restricted if the speech was
deceptive.123 In his concurrence, Justice Stewart elaborated that there
is less tolerance for inaccurate information in commercial speech
because, unlike the press which may need to rely on multiple sources
to verify a statement, a commercial advertiser is well-positioned to
provide accurate information.124
The current approach to First Amendment protection of
commercial speech was articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,125 where the Court
overturned a New York Public Service Commission’s regulation that
prohibited advertising by an electrical utility.126 The Court justified
subjecting restrictions of commercial speech to a lower level of
constitutional scrutiny because of the “common-sense distinction”
between commercial and non-commercial speech and because
commercial transactions are traditionally regulated by the
government.127 In the commercial arena, the First Amendment
balances the listener’s need for information against the government’s
interest in regulating the commercial speaker.128
In Central Hudson, the Court devised a four-prong analysis for
restrictions on commercial speech. First, to receive protection, the
commercial speech must not be false, misleading, or propose an
illegal transaction.129 Misleading commercial speech can be banned
because it is “more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”130
The second prong requires the government to demonstrate a
substantial interest in regulating the commercial speech.131 To
survive the third prong, the regulation must directly advance the
government’s interest.132 Finally, the restriction must be no more
extensive than necessary to serve the government’s interest.133 When
123. Id. at 771.
124. Id. at 777 (Stewart, J., concurring).
125. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
126. Id. at 570–72.
127. Id. at 562–63 (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. See id. at 563 (stating that the conveyance of information through advertising
is why the commercial message receives First Amendment protection); see also POST,
supra note 43, at 42–43 (2012) (explaining that the First Amendment usually protects
the voice of the speaker, while lower levels of protection for commercial speech are
justified by the Court’s focus on protecting the listener).
129. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
130. Id. at 563. The Court notes that First Amendment protection of commercial
speech arises out of the “informational function of advertising.” Id. (citing First Nat’l
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
131. Id. at 566.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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commercial speech is false or misleading, it receives no First
Amendment protection and is examined under rational basis
review.134 If, on the other hand, it is not false or misleading, the
speech receives protection under intermediate scrutiny through
application of the second, third, and fourth prongs.135
The Supreme Court has continued to rely on the First Amendment
to protect consumers in commercial speech cases. In City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,136 the Court overturned a city
ordinance banning commercial news racks except those containing
newspapers.137 The majority held that because the ordinance only
banned news racks with a specific type of content, it was a contentbased restriction.138 Additionally, the content of the news racks had
no differential impact on safety,139 and it was not a reasonable time,
place, or manner restriction because the ordinance differentiated
between news racks based solely on content.140
In his Discovery Network concurrence, Justice Blackmun noted that
he had concurred in Central Hudson only because the commercial
speech restrictions had targeted the substantial government interest
of protecting consumers.141 He did not think commercial speech was
inherently less deserving of protection under the First Amendment.142
He felt that the source of protection for commercial speech was the
listener’s interest, which allowed for only “certain specific” types of
regulations.143 Justice Blackmun was concerned because Central
Hudson left open the possibility that a narrowly drawn restriction on
truthful speech could survive the Court’s four-prong test.144 He
chided the majority for not using this case to address that loophole by
134. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (explaining that misleading
commercial speech can be subject to “appropriate restrictions” or a complete ban);
see also, 1-800-411-Pain Referral Serv., LLC v. Tollefson, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1051,
1055 (D. Minn. 2012) (finding the statutory provision at issue was prohibiting
commercial speech that was “inherently misleading” and therefore the statute did
not violate the First Amendment).
135. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 433–34 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (describing the “lesser protection” that courts should
provide to commercial speech that is not false or misleading).
136. 507 U.S. 410.
137. Id. at 431.
138. Id. at 429.
139. See id. at 430 (noting that there was no concern about “secondary effects”).
140. Id.
141. See id. at 434–35 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that the Central Hudson
majority opinion was not consistent with the Court’s prior cases).
142. Id. at 433.
143. Id. at 433–34.
144. See id. at 435 (noting that the majority opinion in Central Hudson specifically
stated that a restriction in advertising encouraging electricity use might survive
scrutiny if sufficiently narrowly-tailored).
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unequivocally stating that truthful and non-misleading commercial
speech should receive full protection under the First Amendment.145
In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,146 the Court reiterated the
distinction between regulations that address false or misleading
commercial speech and regulations restricting truthful commercial
speech when it overturned Rhode Island’s ban on advertising the
prices of alcoholic beverages.147 The Court reaffirmed that the state’s
ability to regulate commercial speech arises out of the authority to
regulate commercial transactions and the state’s interest in
protecting consumers from harm.148
The Court applied
intermediate scrutiny, rather than rational basis review, when it
analyzed these bans on truthful commercial speech because the
restrictions were less likely to protect consumers and more likely
used to support a governmental policy that could be implemented
without banning speech.149
1.

Commercial speech of professionals
The commercial speech doctrine has primarily been applied to the
speech of health care providers and other professionals in the area of
advertising and soliciting business.150 In fact, as discussed above, the
first case to recognize First Amendment protection of commercial
speech, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, arose from restrictions on
pharmacists advertising brand name drug prices.151
A year later, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,152 the Supreme Court
overturned a ban on legal services advertising.153 The Court rejected
the state’s arguments that advertising prices would have an effect on
professionalism154 or quality of services.155 The Court did not reject
the state’s theory that harm from deceptive advertising might not be
sufficiently restrained by after-the-fact consumer actions because
those consumers might not have the requisite legal expertise to judge

145. See id. at 436 (finding intermediate scrutiny only appropriate for speech
restrictions aimed at protecting consumers from “misleading or coercive speech, or a
regulation related to the time, place, or manner of commercial speech”).
146. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
147. Id. at 501, 516.
148. Id. at 499, 502.
149. Id. at 502–03 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980)).
150. In general, the Supreme Court treats the speech of professionals including
doctors, lawyers, financial advisors and pharmacists the same. Therefore, this section
will use cases from a variety of professions.
151. See supra notes 118–124 and accompanying text for a full discussion of this case.
152. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
153. Id. at 384.
154. Id. at 368.
155. Id. at 378.
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the quality of services.156 However, the Court did reject the argument
that the burden of preventing this harm through oversight of
advertising would be so burdensome on the state as to justify a
complete ban.157 Again the Court noted that restrictions on false or
misleading advertising, illegal transactions advertising, and time,
place, and manner advertising restrictions were permissible.158
The following year, the Court upheld disciplinary actions against a
lawyer for soliciting business through in-person contact, holding that
the punishment did not violate the First Amendment. In Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass’n,159 the Court distinguished the solicitation at issue
from the advertising in Bates because solicitation of business was a
“transaction in which speech is an essential but subordinate
component.”160 The Court explained that states have the power to
make conduct illegal, even when that conduct involves speech,
without violating the First Amendment.161
The Court returned to pharmacist advertising in Thompson v.
Western States Medical Center,162 where it struck down provisions of the
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997163 that
prohibited pharmacies from advertising details about compounding
services.164 While the Court recognized the government’s interest in
preserving the drug-approval process, it noted that there were several
less–restrictive approaches available such as limiting the quantity of
compounded drugs a pharmacy could sell.165 The Court’s opinion
was particularly worried with Congress’s choice to restrict speech over
other approaches, stating “[i]f the First Amendment means anything,
it means that regulating speech must be a last—not first—resort.”166

156. Id. at 379.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 383–84 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973)).
159. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
160. Id. at 457.
161. See id. at 456 (providing examples that “illustrate[] that the State does not
lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public
whenever speech is a component of that activity”).
162. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
163. Pub. L. No 105-115, § 127(a), 111 Stat. 2296, 2328, invalidated by Thompson,
535 U.S. 357.
164. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 360, 377. Compounding allows a pharmacist to create
a patient-tailored medication where one may not be commercially available because
of allergies to a component of the commercially available drug or to alter the flavor
to make a drug more palatable for children. Id. at 360–61, 377.
165. See id. at 370–72 (discussing other potential regulations that would prevent
pharmacists from becoming large-scale drug manufacturers).
166. Id. at 373.
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In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,167 the Supreme Court suggested for the
first time that restrictions on commercial speech should be subject to
heighted First Amendment scrutiny, rather than the intermediate
level articulated in Central Hudson.168 Sorrell involved marketing
The Supreme Court
speech of pharmaceutical companies.169
affirmed a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decision
overturning a Vermont statute that restricted the sale and use of
pharmacies’ prescribing records for marketing purposes.170 Because
the statute only restricted the use of the records for pharmaceutical
marketing, and not for purposes such as research, the Court held
that it was a content-based speech restriction requiring heightened
scrutiny.171 The Court acknowledged that content-based restrictions
might be permissible under the commercial speech doctrine, but
found that Vermont had not shown a neutral justification for the
content-based restriction.172 Interestingly, the Court did not examine
the Central Hudson factors.173 Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent,
observed that the majority’s heightened scrutiny analysis was stricter
than the approach taken in Central Hudson and that content-based
restrictions of commercial speech had never received greater scrutiny
than other restrictions on commercial speech.174 Justice Breyer
concluded that the statute was constitutional under Central Hudson’s
intermediate scrutiny test.175
In United States v. Caronia,176 the Second Circuit returned to the
four-prong test established in Central Hudson but suggested that
content-based restrictions might be subject to heightened scrutiny.177
Relying partly on Sorrell, a divided panel vacated a criminal conviction
for conspiracy to introduce a misbranded drug into interstate
commerce.178 The court found that Caronia was prosecuted for his
speech promoting the off-label use of a drug.179 After establishing
167. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
168. Id. at 2659.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2659, 2672.
171. Id. at 2663–64.
172. Id. at 2672.
173. See id. at 2663–64 (deciding that the government regulation restricting
speech was content-based, and therefore subject to heightened scrutiny); see also
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 164 (2d Cir. 2012) (indicating that the
Supreme Court did not determine the level of heightened scrutiny (i.e.,
intermediate or strict) to apply in Sorrell).
174. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2677 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 2679.
176. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
177. Id. at 164.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 162.
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that the prohibition on off-label promotion by pharmaceutical
companies and their agents was a content-based restriction, the court
applied heightened scrutiny.180 Unlike the Supreme Court in Sorrell,
the Second Circuit explicitly applied the Central Hudson criteria and
held that this speech restriction failed both the third and fourth
prongs.181 The dissenting judge would have held that Caronia was
not prosecuted for his speech, but even if he were, the restriction on
speech would have been constitutional under Central Hudson.182
In summary, while not initially recognizing protection for
commercial speech under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court
has acknowledged some level of commercial speech coverage for
approximately forty years.183 The Court developed the current
commercial speech doctrine more fully in Central Hudson.184 Under
the four-prong test, government restrictions on false or misleading
speech must only satisfy rational basis review, while restrictions on
truthful speech are subjected to intermediate scrutiny.185 However,
several recent cases suggest that content-based restrictions on
commercial speech may be subject to even higher levels of scrutiny.186
D. Conversion Therapy and SB 1172
Until 1973, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) classified
homosexuality as a mental disorder.187 Since the APA removed
homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-III), mainstream mental health organizations’ and
the general public’s views on homosexuality have changed.188 Despite
180. Id. at 164–65.
181. Id. at 166–67.
182. Id. at 172, 181 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
183. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976) (holding that commercial speech is protected by the First
Amendment because customers can only make the best decision when wellinformed).
184. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 563–66 (1980) (expanding the commercial speech analysis by adopting a fourfactor test).
185. Id. at 566.
186. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (holding that
the Vermont statute was a content-based speech restriction requiring heightened
scrutiny); Caronia, 703 F.3d at 164–65
(applying heightened scrutiny after
establishing that the prohibition on off-label promotion by pharmaceutical
companies and their agents was a content-based restriction).
187. Laura A. Gans, Inverts, Perverts, and Converts: Sexual Orientation Conversion
Therapy and Liability, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219, 221–22 (1999) (discussing how
homosexuality was historically considered an illness).
188. See, e.g., “Therapies” to Change Sexual Orientation Lack Medical Justification and
Threaten Health, PAN AM. HEALTH ORG., http://new.paho.org/hq/index.php?option
=com_content&view=article&id=6803&Itemid=1926 (last updated May 18, 2012, 6:43
AM) [hereinafter “Therapies”] (calling homosexuality a “natural variation of human
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this progress, a small group of therapists, led by the National Association
for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH), have continued
to advocate conversion therapy for homosexual clients.189
Most authorities have concluded that conversion therapy is
ineffective.190 The study most frequently cited to support the
effectiveness of conversion therapy191 was retracted by its author, Dr.
Robert Spitzer, for methodological flaws.192 Dr. Spitzer’s original
study used structured interviews to report that the majority of the 200
self-selected individuals gave “reports of change from a
predominantly or exclusively homosexual orientation before therapy
to a predominantly or exclusively heterosexual orientation in the past
year.”193 As part of his retraction, Dr. Spitzer also issued an apology
to “any gay person who wasted time and energy . . . because they
believed that I had proven that reparative therapy works.”194
While conversion therapy has not been demonstrated to be
effective, its harms have been documented. In addition to anecdotal
reports of patients attempting suicide as a result of undergoing
conversion therapy,195 researchers have published larger studies on

sexuality”); see also Lydia Saad, U.S. Acceptance of Gay/Lesbian Relations Is the New
Normal, GALLUP (May 14, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/154634/AcceptanceGay-Lesbian-Relations-New-Normal.aspx (presenting polling results showing fifty-four
percent of American adults consider gay relationships morally acceptable).
189. See, e.g., About NARTH, NAT’L ASSOC. FOR RES. & THERAPY HOMOSEXUALITY,
http://www.narth.com/menus/mission.html#!about2/c1vor (last visited Nov. 19,
2013) (describing NARTH as a “professional and scientific organization
dedicated to the service of persons who experience unwanted homosexual
(same-sex) attractions”).
190. See, e.g., APA Reiterates Position on Reparative Therapies, 36 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 34
(2001),
http://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/newsarticle.aspx?articleid=103194
(encouraging additional research into the risks and benefits of conversion therapy).
191. Robert L. Spitzer, Can Some Gay Men and Lesbians Change Their Sexual
Orientation? 200 Participants Reporting a Change from Homosexual to Heterosexual
Orientation, 32 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 403 (2003).
192. Robert L. Spitzer, Spitzer Reassesses His 2003 Study of Reparative Therapy of
Homosexuality, 41 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 757, 757 (2012). Spitzer felt the fatal flaw
in his study was the inability to validate the subjects’ reported sexual orientation. Id.
Other perceived flaws were that most subjects were not a representative sample of
patients but instead were involved in “transformational ministries,” and bisexuality
was not considered a valid sexual orientation. B.A. Robinson, An Analysis of Dr.
Spitzer’s 2001 Study About Whether Adults Can Change Sexual Orientation, ONT. CONSULTANTS
ON RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_spit.htm (last updated
Oct. 6, 2012).
193. Spitzer, supra note 191, at 403.
194. Spitzer, supra note 192, at 757. It is interesting to note that Spitzer does
not acknowledge that conversion therapy can harm clients, only that it may have
been a waste of their time. See id. (apologizing to any member of the gay
community who wasted time undergoing conversion therapy without
acknowledging the associated harms).
195. See, e.g., Darin Squire, My Ex Ex-Gay Story, NEW DIRECTIONS MINISTRIES OF CAN.,
http://www.newdirection.ca/my-ex-ex-gay-story (last updated Apr. 1, 2013)
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the array of physical and psychological harms that can be suffered by
conversion therapy patients.196 Individuals who have undergone
conversion therapy report a variety of harms, including suicide
attempts, heavy substance abuse, and risky sexual activity.197
Psychological harms included depression and suicide attempts when
the patient failed to change sexual orientation.198 Social harms
included problems with romantic relationships, difficulties
maintaining lasting interpersonal relationships, and family strife.199
Additionally, because patients frequently undergo conversion therapy
due to religious concerns, failed therapy can lead to “(a) complete
loss of faith, (b) sense of betrayal by religious leaders, (c) anger at
clinicians who introduced punitive and shaming concepts of God,
and (d) excommunication.”200
In addition to the harm individuals undergoing therapy
experience, conversion therapy can cause hardship for entire
families. Parents with no mental health expertise are often the force
compelling minors to enter conversion therapy.201 While parents
have a right to oversee the upbringing of their children,202 the
availability of an ineffective therapy aimed at changing an immutable
characteristic misleads parents by perpetuating their false belief that
homosexuality is changeable.203 The belief in the mutability of sexual
orientation leads some parents to question their role in their child’s
sexual orientation and can contribute to parental rejection of the
child.204 Reaction to this parental rejection may ultimately lead to the
child’s homelessness, prostitution, substance abuse, or HIV

(describing the author’s difficulty reconciling his homosexuality with New
Direction’s reparative therapy leading him to attempt suicide).
196. See Shidlo & Schroeder, supra note 1, at 253 (noting psychological harm
including suicidal gestures, social and interpersonal harms from difficulty with
interpersonal relationships, and physical harms from unsafe sex and substance abuse).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 254. Other psychological harms reported included blaming all the
hardship in their lives on their sexual orientation and the development of
psychological impotence and other sexual dysfunctions. Id. at 255.
199. Id. Some individuals also reported being encouraged by their therapist to
blame their parents for their sexual orientation further straining family relationships.
Id.
200. Id. at 256.
201. See Sonia Renee Martin, Note, A Child’s Right to be Gay: Addressing the
Emotional Maltreatment of Queer Youth, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 174 (1996) (discussing
the role of parents in seeking therapy to help their homosexual children
become heterosexual).
202. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (upholding parents’
right to hire a German teacher for their children).
203. See, Martin, supra note 201, at 174 (attributing parents’ belief in the mutability
of homosexuality as one factor influencing rejection of their gay children).
204. Id.
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infection.205 Ongoing conflict between parents and gay youth is also a
frequent cause of youth suicide.206 The harms associated with
conversion therapy have led some authors to argue that conversion
therapy administered to children should constitute child abuse,
allowing states to use their police powers to prosecute parents.207
Other authors have argued for tort causes of action against
conversion therapists.208
No mainstream medical organization supports conversion therapy.
In 2000, the APA reaffirmed its 1973 declassification of
homosexuality as a mental disorder and reiterated its earlier position
questioning conversion therapy.209 The APA recommends that
“ethical practitioners refrain from attempts to change individuals’
sexual orientation, keeping in mind the medical dictum to first, do
no harm.”210 The Pan American Health Organization has declared
conversion therapy dangerous for patients and recommends that
such therapies should be discouraged and providers subjected to
sanctions.211 Other organizations have acknowledged the harm and
stopped providing reparative therapy.212
On September 29, 2012, California Governor Jerry Brown signed
Senate Bill 1172 out of concern over the ineffectiveness and potential
harms of conversion therapy.213
Senate Bill 1172 amended
California’s Business and Professions Code to ban all mental health
providers from providing conversion therapy to a patient less than
eighteen years of age and defines any attempted conversion therapy
as unprofessional conduct subject to discipline by the appropriate
licensing authority.214 However, the law does not ban religious
205. See id. at 176–78 (reviewing the evidence of harmful outcomes in gay youth).
206. See id. at 175 (citing a 1989 U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services report).
207. See generally Hicks, supra note 3, at 526 (arguing that under New York state law
parents could be prosecuted because a “reasonably prudent parent” would not have
a child receive a dangerous therapy).
208. See Gans, supra note 187, at 221 (discussing how patients can use negligent
malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against conversion
therapists, but arguing for a lower threshold of proof in these types of cases).
209. APA Reiterates, supra note 190.
210. Id.
211. “Therapies,” supra note 188.
212. See Wendy Gritter, A Letter to Ex-Gay Survivors, NEW DIRECTION MINISTRIES OF
CAN., http://www.newdirection.ca/a-letter-to-ex-gay-survivors (last visited Nov. 19,
2013) (acknowledging that people have been harmed by New Direction’s “ex-gay
theology,” and stating that New Direction is now purporting that people can be
homosexual and Christian).
213. Buchanan, supra note 2.
214. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865. SB 1172 bans “sexual orientation change
efforts” to include “any practices” that seeks to change sexual orientation. Id.
§ 865(b)(1). The statute does not ban therapies aimed at helping minors accept
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counseling aimed at changing sexual orientation.215 California was the
first state to attempt such a ban.216 New Jersey subsequently passed a
similar ban.217 Several other states are considering similar legislation.218
Senate Bill 1172 was challenged almost immediately. Plaintiffs in
Welch v. Brown, a suit initiated two days after Governor Brown signed
the bill into law, charged that the law violated the First Amendment
right to freedom of speech for individual conversion therapists and a
mental–health-professions student.219 A similar case, Pickup v. Brown,
was filed by NARTH, individual therapists, and parents of conversion
therapy patients three days later.220
Two judges from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California ultimately came to opposing conclusions on the cases
challenging SB 1172. In Welch, Judge Shubb granted a preliminary
injunction after determining that the law was a content- and
viewpoint-based restriction of speech.221 The judge stated that the
regulation was unlikely to survive strict scrutiny because the
government had only shown that conversion therapy “may” harm
minors, and such level of review requires that the government show
that the therapy directly causes harm to minors.222 Simultaneously, a
request for a preliminary injunction was denied in Pickup, where
Judge Mueller ruled that the law did not restrict expressive
their sexual orientation. Id. § 865(b)(2). Although this could include practices such
as electroshock and hormone therapy, this Comment focuses on conversion therapy
as that is the practice where a First Amendment challenge is relevant.
215. See id. § 865(a) (leaving religious positions out of the definition of mentalhealth provider).
216. Buchanan, supra note 2.
217. Act Concerning the Protection of Minors from Attempts to Change Sexual
Orientation, 2013 N.J. Sess. Laws ch. 150 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-55 (West
2013)); see also Zack Ford, Chris Christie Signs New Jersey Bill Banning Ex-Gay Therapy for
Minors, THINK PROGRESS (Aug. 19, 2013, 9:11 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2013
/08/19/2486811/chris-christie-signs-new-jersey-bill-banning-ex-gay-therapy-for-minors
(quoting Governor Chris Christie’s statement that he “does not believe in
conversion therapy”).
218. See H.B. 154, 188th Leg. (Mass. 2013) (Massachusetts); S.B. 4840, 2013 Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2013) (New York); Daniel Reynolds, Pa. Reps. to Propose Bill Banning “ExGay” Therapy for Youth, ADVOCATE.COM (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.advocate.com
/politics/politicians/2013/09/17/pa-reps-propose-bill-banning-ex-gay-therapy-youth)
(Pennsylvania). Ohio is also considering a ban. Katie McDonough, Ohio May be Next State
to Ban Gay Conversion Therapy, SALON (Oct. 7, 2013, 12:53 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013
/10/07/ohio_may_be_next_state_to_ban_gay_conversion_therapy.
219. Complaint, Welch v. Brown, supra note 8, ¶¶ 77–92.
220. Complaint, Pickup v. Brown, supra note 8, ¶¶ 1–12.
221. Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1121–22 (E.D. Cal. 2012), rev’d sub
nom. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013).
222. See id. at 1119–20 (pointing out that the American Psychiatric Association
Report relied on by legislators stated that the authors could not conclude harm
would occur and also noting that the studies had focused on harm to adult but not
minor patients).
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conduct.223 The act also did not discipline a provider who informed a
minor patient that they would benefit from conversion therapy;
providers would only be disciplined for actually providing such
therapy to a minor.224
Both cases were appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which in a
consolidated appeal affirmed Pickup and reversed Welch.225 Relying
primarily on National Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis and
Conant, the court held that the statute at issue regulated professional
conduct, not speech, and was therefore permissible.226 The court
noted that while most medical treatment involves some degree of
speech, the First Amendment would not protect a doctor trying to
treat a patient with a banned medication.227 The court also cited the
well-settled principle that the First Amendment does not protect criminal
conduct that is “merely . . . carried out” through speech.228
II. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE IS A MORE APPROPRIATE
APPROACH FOR EXAMINING RESTRICTIONS ON HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS’ SPEECH
If the Ninth Circuit had determined that SB 1172 was a restriction
on speech instead of conduct, the court likely would have ruled that
SB 1172 was an unconstitutional viewpoint-based restriction under a
traditional strict scrutiny analysis and current case law. The Ninth
Circuit previously ruled in Conant that a federal restriction on health
care providers recommending medical marijuana was an
unconstitutional viewpoint-based restriction.229 In National Ass’n for
the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, the Ninth Circuit upheld
California’s restrictions on licensing mental health providers in
part because the restrictions were content neutral—they did not
restrict the content of therapy or the use of specific types of

223. Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12 02497 KJM EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at *7, *26
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012), aff’d, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013).
224. See id. at *9 (distinguishing SB 1172 from the medical marijuana policy at
issue in Conant and the Florida firearms law in Wollschlaeger, both of which penalized
speech based on the topic).
225. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1061 (9th Cir. 2013), rev’g Welch v. Brown,
907 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Cal. 2012), and aff’g Pickup v. Brown, Civ. No. 2:12 02497
KJM EFB, 2012 WL 6021465 (E.D. Cal. Dec 4, 2012).
226. Id. at 1055–57.
227. See id. at 1055 (explaining that such reasoning would restrict states’ power to
regulate medical care).
228. Id. (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)).
229. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming a
permanent injunction against a state statute that regulated doctor-speech based on
the meanings attributed by listeners).
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therapy.230 Based partly on the results of these cases, at least one
prominent constitutional scholar believed the Ninth Circuit was
going to find this law unconstitutional.231
The Supreme Court would also likely find SB 1172
unconstitutional if the law is viewed as a restriction on speech and
not conduct. In Rosenberger, the Supreme Court held that a
restriction prohibiting student religious newspapers was an
unconstitutional viewpoint-based restriction.232
Unlike the
restrictions on discussing abortion in a federally funded family
planning program clinic in Rust v. Sullivan, which were ruled
constitutional,233 the restrictions in SB 1172 are not limited to health
care provided solely as part of government-funded services.234
Because SB 1172 is a content-based restriction on speech, the Court
would likely apply heightened scrutiny as it did in Sorrell, where the
Court invalidated a content-based restriction because it did not have
a neutral justification.235 Therefore, SB 1172 would likely be
invalidated as an unconstitutional restriction on health care
providers’ speech.
However, standard strict scrutiny is not the appropriate test to use
for restrictions on health care providers’ speech. Because health care
providers’ speech is more akin to commercial speech than to the
speech of private citizens, it should only be subject to strict scrutiny if
it is not false or misleading. The Supreme Court’s reasoning for
230. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that, although the
statute may implicate speech interests, it neither “dictate[s] what can be said”
between doctors and patients nor suppresses speech based on message).
231. Eugene Volokh, District Judges Split on Whether California Ban on Sexual
Orientation Change Therapy for Minors Is Constitutional, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 5,
2012 10:18 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/12/05/district-judges-split-on-whethercalifornia-ban-on-sexual-orientation-change-therapy-for-minors-is-constitutional (opining
that the approach in Welch is more in line with precedent in the Ninth Circuit).
232. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(“The government must abstain from regulating speech when . . . the opinion or
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”).
233. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177–79 (1991) (explaining that the
restrictions on discussing abortion in a federally funded family planning clinic was
appropriate because it was intended to ensure that government funds would only be
used to support preventative family planning services, infertility services, and other
related medical, informational, and educational activities).
234. See id. at 198–99 (explaining that the restriction on speech is not applicable
to speech outside the federally funded project).
235. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (discussing the
permissibility of content-based restrictions in the commercial speech setting, while
noting that Vermont has not demonstrated a neutral justification). It appears that
this was the first time that content-neutrality was discussed in the setting of
commercial speech restrictions. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 163 (2d
Cir. 2012) (explaining that Sorrell provided guidance to the Circuit Court that was
not available to the District Court that ruled prior to the Sorrell decision).
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refusing to apply First Amendment protection to false or misleading
commercial speech under the first prong of Central Hudson also
applies to health care speech that lacks any scientific support.236 This
single-prong approach will allow courts to weed out quackery—health
care speech lacking any legitimate scientific support.237 However,
unlike typical commercial speech analysis, the remaining prongs of
Central Hudson would not apply to health care speech that has some
scientific support. Unlike speech within the commercial arena,
health care therapies need to be tailored to the individual patient.238
Legislatures do not have the expertise to make those determinations,
which is why professionals in the field usually set their own
standards.239 Therefore, health care providers’ speech that is not
false or misleading continues to require full First Amendment
protection in order to protect the doctor-patient relationship from
inappropriate government interference.
A. The Rationale for Reduced First Amendment Protection of Commercial
Speech Also Applies to Health Care Providers’ Speech
The same reasoning courts have employed to justify using
intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech, and refraining from
applying First Amendment protection to false or misleading
commercial speech, applies in the health care setting. Commercial
speech serves a different purpose than political speech, which is why
the former does not receive full First Amendment protection. In
political discourse, the First Amendment is most concerned with
allowing everyone to participate, a concept that Yale Law Professor
and First Amendment scholar Robert Post calls democratic
legitimization.240 The premise is that false (or bad) ideas will be
drowned out by the true (or good) ideas, but everyone will feel heard
and engaged in the democratic process.241
Courts have justified applying lower levels of First Amendment
protection for commercial speech because such speech is not
236. See infra Part II.A (noting that the state may regulate health care speech in
the same manner it regulates commercial speech because the same justification
underlies both: protecting the consumer by preventing harm).
237. See infra Part II.B (arguing that health care speech lacking legitimate
scientific support should be treated analogous to false and misleading speech under
the commercial speech doctrine).
238. See infra Part II.C.
239. See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text.
240. See POST, supra note 43, at 1–25 (rejecting First Amendment philosophy that
emphasizes protections only in the context of voting and instead embracing the idea
that “First Amendment coverage should extend to all efforts deemed normatively
necessary for influencing public opinion”).
241. Id. at 21.
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necessary to the open marketplace of ideas nor central to political
discourse.242 The Supreme Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence
is based on protecting the consumer rather than the speaker.243 The
Court developed the first prong of Central Hudson because false or
misleading commercial speech could deceive the listener.244 The
Court reiterated the state’s ability to regulate commercial speech in
44 Liquormart, stating that this authority arose out of the interest in
protecting the listener.245
Intermediate scrutiny is applied to commercial speech because the
government traditionally regulates commercial transactions;
therefore, the government has a stronger interest in regulating
commercial speech in general.246 Because the state can regulate
harmful commercial activity, the state can regulate that activity even
when speech is a component of the activity.247 In his dissent in Central
Hudson, Justice Rehnquist went so far as to argue for no First
Amendment protection for the utility company’s speech because the
utility was a highly regulated, state-created monopoly.248 He went on
to comment that from the perspective of the First Amendment, the
utility is more like a “state-controlled enterprise than is an ordinary
corporation.”249 As such, the state should have more leeway in
regulating the speech of the utility it controls.250
As previously discussed, in some cases the Court has also upheld
restrictions on commercial speech, noting the importance of
242. See id. at 40–42 (noting that commercial speech is only useful to the listener
when it is “reliable, rather than misleading, information”).
243. See id. at 42–43 (explaining that the First Amendment usually serves to
protect the voice of the speaker, while lower levels of protection for commercial
speech are justified by the Court’s focus on protecting the listener).
244. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 563 (1980) (stating the government can go as far as banning deceptive speech
(citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15–16 (1979))).
245. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502 (1996) (calling
protecting consumers the “typical” reason behind greater governmental regulation
of commercial speech).
246. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (describing the level of protection for
commercial speech as a function of both the nature of the expression and
governmental interest being regulated); see also 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 499, 502
(distinguishing commercial speech as an area where the government has more
freedom to regulate, but preventing the government from enacting an all-out ban on
truthful commercial speech); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
410, 428 (1993) (requiring the government to make a showing to ban commercial
speech beyond merely classifying commercial speech as “low value”).
247. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (explaining that
conduct can be made illegal even if the conduct is carried out through speech).
248. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 584 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing the
law at issue as an economic regulation).
249. Id. at 587.
250. See id. (arguing that a state should have “broad discretion” to regulate what
statements a public utility can make).
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preventing harm before it occurs. In Bates, the Court did not
substantively address the argument that “[a]fter-the-fact action by the
consumer” may not provide adequate protection against deceptive
advertising.251 Instead, the Court rejected this argument because it
contradicted others put forth by the state and because it would not
have justified a complete ban on advertising simply to avoid the
burden of disciplining lawyers who advertised deceptively.252 In
Ohralik, the Court noted the state’s strong interest in preventing
harm before it occurred when the state prohibited in-person
solicitation of businesses by lawyers.253 In health care, as in the
commercial arena, it is important to prevent harm before it occurs.
This is one justification for states’ control over the licensing of health
care providers.254
Health care therapies, including talking therapies, do not take
place in the marketplace of ideas and therefore do not require the
same level of First Amendment protection as public speech. Like
commercial transactions and the electrical utility company in Central
Hudson, health care is highly regulated by the states.255 In health
care, the state’s interest is not to allow everyone to participate; this is
clear from the fact that not everyone is permitted to enter the
profession. State licensing authorities can limit who can practice
health care256 and can set educational requirements.257 Furthermore,
they can discipline, and even bar from practicing, those providers
who deviate from the established standards of care.258 A provider’s
treatment of a patient with therapy is a medical intervention for
which any speech that may be involved is only incidental to the
purpose of treatment. Even psychotherapy, which may consist
entirely of speech, does not receive special First Amendment
protection; the purpose of psychotherapy is not speechit is
relieving emotional suffering.259
Simply having a “kernel of
251. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977) (discussing the
difficulty a layman might have in evaluating the quality of a lawyer’s services).
252. See id. (commenting that each deceptive lawyer will be outnumbered by
“thousands of others” who are not deceptive).
253. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978) (describing the
restrictions as “prophylactic measures whose objective is the prevention of harm
before it occurs”).
254. See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text (detailing how states are
empowered to issue licenses and establish standards to regulate health care practice
for the protection of public health).
255. See supra Part I.A.
256. 53 C.J.S. Licenses, supra note 19, § 8.
257. Id.
258. Id. § 82.
259. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that communications made
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expression” in an activity such as therapy does not demand full First
Amendment coverage.260 The speech in therapy or other health care
settings is not the kind of speech envisioned as protected by the First
Amendment, which is instead typically thought of as providing
protection for political speech.261 Health care or therapeutic speech
does not serve the role of political discourse in the marketplace of
ideas; therefore, First Amendment protection for health care speech
should focus on the listener, not the speaker.262
Admittedly, there are nuances to this approach. Some speech
between health care providers and patients would fall outside a
therapeutic purpose and could qualify as political discourse. For
example, a health care provider’s speech to a patient explaining that
a therapy is not currently available would be protected under the
marketplace of ideas theory because it might lead the patient to lobby
the legislature for increased research funding to demonstrate the
utility of the therapy.263 Robert Post gives the additional example of a
dentist who writes a book encouraging the removal of mercury
fillings, which would be protected speech under the marketplace of
ideas, while the same dentist’s advice to an individual patient would
not be protected.264
Like Post’s dentist who provided individual advice, the health care
provider’s speech to patients as part of treatment exists outside the
marketplace of ideas, and therefore does not require full First
Amendment protection. Thus, the same reasoning the Supreme
Court has used to justify reduced scrutiny for commercial speech also
applies to speech in the health care setting.
B. The First Prong of Central Hudson Weeds Out Quackery
By applying the first prong of Central Hudson to regulations of
health care providers’ speech, courts can weed out quackery. Under
during psychoanalysis are protected by the Constitution, but may still nevertheless be
regulated in furtherance of important state interests).
260. Id. (quoting City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)).
261. See POST, supra note 43, at 42–43 (arguing that expert knowledge, like
commercial speech, serves the rights of the listener, not the rights of the speaker).
262. See id. at 24 (differentiating between the First Amendment’s role in public
discourse of protecting the rights of the speaker and its role in protecting the
“dignity of the targets of speech” outside public discourse).
263. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 634 (9th Cir. 2002) (listing the district
court’s finding that physician speech could lead to a patient petitioning the
government for a change in marijuana laws).
264. See POST, supra note 43, at 12–13 (explaining why the dentist would have
First Amendment protection against malpractice claims from a patient who
relied on her advice in the book, but not against a claims from a patient who
relied on individual advice).
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that prong, courts evaluate whether the commercial speech being
regulated is false or misleading and therefore not protected by the
First Amendment.265
The First Amendment protects false speech in political discourse.266
False commercial speech, however, does not receive this level of
protection.267 The fact that a commercial speaker can easily
determine whether his speech is factually correct, unlike the press or
a private citizen who may need to use multiple sources to verify the
truth of a statement, justifies government restrictions on false or
misleading commercial speech.268 The government can even go so
far as to ban deceptive commercial speech.269 Allowing these
restrictions on false or misleading commercial speech serves the
state’s interest in preventing fraud.270
The interest in preventing fraud in health care is just as strong
asor stronger thanthe state’s interest in the commercial speech
realm.271 Health care fraud carries not only the risk of economic
harm, but can result in physical and mental harm as well.272 Thus,
the same reasoning courts have used to support restrictions on false
or misleading commercial speech is applicable to restrictions on
health care providers’ speech in order to prevent fraud.
Still, the question remains: how should courts evaluate whether or
not the health care providers’ speech is false or misleading? The
answer lies in the health care setting’s analogy to false and misleading
speechwhether the speech lacks legitimate scientific support.
Health care services without some scientific support have no
therapeutic potential. Administering these unsubstantiated services
265. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
266. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) (“Under the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.”).
267. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (stating that there is no constitutional
barrier to restricting inaccurate commercial messages).
268. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 777 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that the principles behind libel may
allow the government to protect the public from false advertising because
commercial advertisers are better positioned to verify the truth of their speech).
269. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15–
16 (1979)).
270. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502 (1996).
271. 39A C.J.S. Health & Environment § 1 (2003) (“[T]here is no public policy
more important than the protection of citizens from practices which may injure
their health.”).
272. See Rooting Out Health Care Fraud Is Central to the Well-being of Both Our Citizens
and the Overall Economy, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/investigate/white_collar/health-care-fraud (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (describing
health care fraud as costing the U.S. economy approximately $80 billion a year and
noting that fraudulent providers are putting patients at risk).
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is the health care equivalent of fraud, which is the harm the first
prong of Central Hudson aims to avoid.
Courts are able to evaluate relevant evidence and determine if
there is any legitimate scientific support for the restricted speech.
This approach is already used in the methodology for determining
whether to admit scientific evidence laid out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.273 While admitting or rejecting expert testimony
is different than making a constitutional determination, the same
Daubert factors can be used. In Daubert, the Court first defined
scientific knowledge as more than a belief or speculation.274
Scientific knowledge must be “ground[ed] in the methods and
procedures of science.”275 The Court then stated that in choosing to
allow expert scientific testimony, judges must determine whether the
methodology used to develop the scientific testimony is valid.276 The
Court delineated four factors judges could consider, including
whether: the science can be tested,277 it is published in peer-reviewed
literature,278 there is knowledge of error rates,279 and the science has
The Court expanded on the
gained “general acceptance.”280
importance of acceptance in the scientific community by stating “a
known technique which has been able to attract only minimal support
within the community, may properly be viewed with skepticism.”281
Courts can also rely on experts in the relevant discipline. In his
dissent in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,282 a case involving
restrictions on the sale of violent video games to minors, Justice
Breyer noted that while most judges, including himself, lacked
scientific expertise, public health professionals who had that
expertise found a significant risk from violent video games.283 Robert
Post argues that courts should use the methods of a scientific

273. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
274. Id. at 590.
275. Id.
276. See id. at 592–93 (instructing judges to do a “preliminary assessment” of the
scientific validity).
277. See id. at 593 (stating the testing of hypotheses is the basis of the scientific
method).
278. See id. (describing the aspect of submitting for peer review, even if not
published, as “a component of ‘good science’”).
279. See id. at 594 (citing cases examining the error rate of voice identification
techniques).
280. Id.
281. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
282. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
283. See id. at 2769 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting position statements from
several public health, medical, and psychological associations).
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discipline to evaluate the validity of that discipline’s knowledge.284
Only that discipline’s methodology can determine the validity of work
within the field.285 The Supreme Court recognized this in School
Board v. Arline,286 when it endorsed the idea that courts should
defer to public health officials in determining whether a
contagious disease created a risk to others, rather than making an
independent determination.287
In Daubert, the Supreme Court expressed its confidence that judges
could make these scientific validity evaluations of experts.288 Its
confidence was well-founded as, on remand, the Ninth Circuit used
the criteria to determine that the plaintiffs’ experts did not qualify as
scientific experts.289 The Ninth Circuit relied on several factors
including that the experts had not submitted their research for peer
review during the more than ten years of litigation, had not been
doing the research prior to being hired for litigation, and in one
case, had made an assertion without a testable hypothesis.290
The fact that courts have acknowledged the presence of scientific
controversydemonstrating at least some evidence of legitimate
scientific supportin several of the health care First Amendment
cases previously discussed is further evidence that courts are capable
of determining what constitutes legitimate scientific debate.291 For
instance, in his Conant concurrence, Judge Kozinski used over two

284. See POST, supra note 43, at 54–59 (arguing that applying the disciplinary
methods by which the expert knowledge is defined is the only way to judicially
protect “democratic competence”).
285. See id. (using the example of a dental regulation and asserting that “[a] court
will have no option but to apply the authoritative methods and truths of medical
service in order to determine whether prohibiting the dentist’s advice will trigger
First Amendment review”).
286. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
287. See id. at 287–88 (adopting the American Medical Association’s position with
respect to how a district court should make factual determinations when considering
discrimination claims of a person with a contagious disease).
288. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993)
(suggesting several criteria by which a judge can make this determination, including
whether the theory or technique has been tested, whether it has been peer reviewed,
and what the rate of error is).
289. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir.
1995) (ruling testimony for the plaintiffs was inadmissible because necessary
changes to meet the evidentiary standard would “undermine any attempt to show
that these findings were ‘derived by the scientific method’” (quoting Daubert, 509
U.S. at 590))).
290. Id. at 1318–19.
291. See supra Part I.B (discussing the Court’s experiences adjudicating laws
related to the use of cannabis for therapeutic purposes, the doctor-patient privilege
in inquiring about owning firearms, and informing individuals about the increased
risk of suicide for those who get abortions).
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pages to discuss the science behind medical marijuana.292 He noted
the presence of a “genuine difference of expert opinion” with
significant evidence on both sides of the debate.293 Similarly, in
another case, the Eighth Circuit took eleven pages to explore the
scientific uncertainty surrounding abortion and the increased risk of
suicide in order to affirm the validity of disclosure language required
by a South Dakota statute.294
Similar to identifying whether commercial speech is false or
misleading, courts can determine if health care therapies have any
legitimate scientific support using the same approach used to
evaluate potential expert scientific testimony. The theories lacking
legitimate scientific support would, like false or misleading
commercial speech, lack First Amendment protection. However,
speech with some scientific support would continue to receive First
Amendment protection.
C. Health Care Providers’ Speech Surviving the First Prong of Central
Hudson Should Be Subject to Strict Scrutiny
If a court finds that the regulations on health care speech are
truthful and non-misleading under the first prong of Central Hudson,
traditional strict scrutiny would be the appropriate test to apply.
Applying strict scrutiny would continue to protect the doctor-patient
relationship from inappropriate state intervention.
While the
arguments likening such speech to commercial speech might suggest
that intermediate scrutiny would be appropriate for examining
restrictions on truthful and non-misleading health care providers’
speech, the risk of the government suppressing this truthful speech
demands the highest level of First Amendment protection.295 Under
the alternative, intermediate scrutiny, the government could restrict
truthful and non-misleading health care providers’ speech if those
restrictions directly advanced a substantial government interest and
were no more extensive than necessary.296
292. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 641–43 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring) (referencing the various studies conducted by the National Institute of
Medicine, National Academy of Sciences and the federal government on the
scientific evidence behind the therapeutic application of cannabis).
293. Id. at 643.
294. See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 893–905
(8th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (evaluating the term “increased risk” within the vast array
of peer-reviewed medical literature discussing abortion and suicide rates).
295. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 637 (emphasizing that professional speech requires
the highest level of First Amendment protection (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For It,
Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995))).
296. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
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There are several reasons intermediate scrutiny would not provide
sufficient protection. First, patients and providers need open
communication,297 without which providers may not have all the
information necessary to treat the patient.298 The importance of
open communication is demonstrated by the presence of the doctorpatient privilege, which exists under common law and allows patients
to speak openly with their doctor without fearing the doctor will be
called to testify against them.299 Second, patients need to be able to
trust their provider.300 This trust is essential because patients look to
their providers for expert judgment upon which they can rely.301
Third, providers need to be able to offer all appropriate therapies to
individual patients.302
In addition, the unique nature of the relationship between doctor
and patient, a defining feature of the health care profession, requires
that the health care provider be able to give individualized advice.303
Patients may have different goals, such as prolonging life or reducing
pain and suffering, and these goals may require diverse treatments.304
Additionally, patients may respond to treatments differently or
require adjustments in their treatments.
It is not appropriate for legislatures to make broad determinations
regarding which scientifically supported potential therapies are
appropriate for individual patients. Most legislators lack health care
expertise, which is why professional standards are set by the state
licensing authority and not by the legislature.305 As previously

297. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 636 (describing open communication as an “integral
component” of medicine).
298. Id. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
299. See id. (explaining that the importance of this privileged communication is
such that it has been adopted by the courts in common law and through the rules of
evidence (citing FED. R. EVID. 501))).
300. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 218 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(noting that patients put “complete confidence, and often their very lives” in the
hands of physicians).
301. See P OST , supra note 43, at 45 (asserting malpractice liability enforces
“expert pronouncements”).
302. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (calling it an ethical
responsibility).
303. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the
result) (defining a professional as one who works directly with a client on that
client’s behalf).
304. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting that patient
autonomy is only enabled when patients have the information necessary to make an
autonomous choice).
305. See Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 611 (1935)
(commenting that state regulation occurs through administrative boards).
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discussed, it takes training and expertise in a discipline to critically
evaluate the quality of work in that discipline.306
As an example of the potential problem in applying only
intermediate scrutiny, a court might find that the federal
government’s restriction on recommending medical marijuana could
be a restriction that is no more extensive than necessary to directly
advance the government’s substantial interest in reducing illegal drug
use. This would allow the legislature to prevent a physician from
recommending medical marijuana for an end-stage AIDS patient with
severe weight loss and lack of appetite or a cancer patient with
uncontrollable pain in a state where such use is legal under state law.307
Therefore, while the similarities to commercial speech might
suggest that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for truthful and
non-misleading health care providers’ speech, intermediate scrutiny
does not provide sufficient protection. Applying strict scrutiny to
truthful and non-misleading speech would be in line with the general
approach the Supreme Court has taken with health care provider
speech in the past.308 In addition, applying strict scrutiny would be
consistent with the Court’s recent approach to content-based
restrictions on commercial speech as articulated in Sorrell.309 For
these reasons, speech that survives the first prong of Central Hudson
should continue to be analyzed under traditional strict scrutiny.
D. Senate Bill 1172 Would Be Upheld Under this “Single-Prong” Approach
When examined under this proposed single-prong approach, SB
1172 would be upheld as a constitutional exercise of the state’s police
powers for protecting the health and well-being of minors even if it is
viewed as a restriction on speech. Under the first prong analysis of
Central Hudson, the “therapeutic” speech affected by SB 1172 would
be found false and misleading. Conversion therapy would fail this
analysis on several of the Daubert criteria.310 First, conversion therapy
306. See POST, supra note 43, at 54–59 (examining how courts would determine
whether homeopathic medicine is a scientific discipline).
307. See Marijuana, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/treatment/treatments
andsideeffects/complementaryandalternativemedicine/herbsvitaminsandminerals/
marijuana (last updated July 13, 2012) (explaining that marijuana is used for pain
and appetite stimulation for people with AIDS or cancer).
308. See supra Parts I.B.1 and I.B.2 (exploring the protections the Supreme Court
has afforded regarding medical marijuana and firearms).
309. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (finding
Vermont’s restrictions on the sale of prescribing data for pharmaceutical
marketing purposes as an unconstitutional content-based restriction subject to
heightened scrutiny).
310. See supra notes 273–281 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Daubert criteria.
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lacks general acceptance; it is not supported by any mainstream
medical or psychological organization.311 Instead, supporters of
conversion therapy are primarily religious groups.312 The Supreme
Court has previously been suspicious of scientific support put forward
only by church-based scientific organizations.313 The only reportedly
professional association supporting conversion therapy is NARTH.
However, few people consider NARTH a legitimate scientific
organization.314 Second, conversion therapy has never been proven
effective in a methodologically valid study,315 but it has been
demonstrated as harmful.316 As a result, there are few primary
research publications supporting conversion therapy in the scientific
literature outside those published by NARTH-affiliated authors.317
Given the lack of general acceptance of conversion therapy as a
legitimate therapeutic approach and the lack of supportive evidence
in the scientific literature, courts will likely be skeptical about its
311. See supra notes 209–212 and accompanying text (arguing that experts have
found conversion therapy harmful to patients).
312. See, e.g., The Truth About “Converting” Gay People, OUTFRONT MINN.,
http://www.outfront.org/library/exgay/facts (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (describing
these “ex-gay” groups as being “religious-based” or “quasi-mental-health” groups); see
also Hicks, supra note 3, at 508 (discussing religious approaches used in addition to
therapy to attempt to change sexual orientation). Exodus International, one of the
largest Christian-based organizations advocating conversion therapy recently issued
an apology to the gay community and then shut down a few hours later. Ed Payne,
Group Apologizes to Gay Community, Shuts Down “Cure” Ministry, CNN (July 8, 2013, 2:04
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/20/us/exodus-international-shutdown.
313. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 601–02 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring)
(discussing the lack of scientific methodology evidence and the groups’ reliance on
church doctrine in declaring themselves creation scientists).
314. See, e.g., Ryan Lenz, NARTH Becomes Main Source for Anti-Gay “Junk Science,”
INTELL. REP., Spring 2012, at 2, available at http://www.splcenter.org/getinformed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2012/spring/queer-science (“In fact,
every major American medical authority has concluded that there is no scientific
support for NARTH’s view, and many have expressed concern that reparative
therapy can cause harm.”).
315. See supra notes 190–192 and accompanying text (noting that the most
commonly cited study was retracted by its author).
316. See supra notes 194–208 and accompanying text (describing the documented
harms of conversion therapy).
317. For example, a search of PubMed for the term (“sexual orientation”) AND
(“change efforts” OR “change therapy” OR “conversion therapy”) revealed 10 studies, only
one of which is primary research on homosexual patients. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih
.gov/pubmed/?term=(%22sexual+orientation%22)+AND+(%22change+efforts%22+
OR+%22change+therapy%22+OR+%22conversion+therapy%22) (last accessed Sept.
26, 2013). PubMed is the U.S. National Library of Medicine’s link to more than 23
million citations from biomedical literature. PubMed Help, PUBMED.GOV, http://www
.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK3827/#pubmedhelp.FAQs (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
The primary author of the article, Retrospective Self-reports of Changes in Homosexual
Orientation: A Consumer Survey of Conversion Therapy Patients, Dr. Joseph Nicolosi, is a
member of the Board of Directors of NARTH. NARTH Officers and Board Members, NAT’L
ASSOC. FOR RES. & THERAPY OF HOMOSEXUALITY, http://www.narth.com/2011/11/narthofficers#!ourteam/cqn6 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).

FULTZ.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

1/9/2014 3:46 PM

IF IT QUACKS LIKE A DUCK

605

validity.318 If courts apply the professional practices of mainstream
psychology, as Robert Post argues they should, they will likely
determine that NARTH “does not itself produce constitutionally
valuable knowledge” and would therefore find the organization’s
evidence invalid.319
Under this single-prong approach, once courts have determined
that conversion therapy is not a legitimate therapeutic approach, SB
1172 would only be subject to rational basis review.320 Under rational
basis review, a statute is constitutional if it is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.321 Protecting minors from harm is a
legitimate state interest.322 Banning conversion therapy for minors is
rationally related to that legitimate interest because the harms of
conversion therapy have been demonstrated.323 Therefore, because
SB 1172 is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, it would be
a constitutional exercise of the state’s police powers under rational
basis review.
CONCLUSION
Giving full First Amendment coverage to health care providers’
speech has served to protect the doctor-patient relationship from
attempted content- and viewpoint-based restrictions. This approach
has worked well for speech supported by some scientific evidence, even
when there is a lack of scientific consensus. However, when that speech
involves quackery, the traditional use of strict scrutiny can undermine
the states’ attempts at using their police powers to protect citizens.
The same reasoning and approach the Supreme Court has used for
analyzing commercial speech under the First Amendment should
apply to health care providers’ speech within the doctor-patient
relationship. Using the first prong of Central Hudson, this singleprong approach allows courts to identify the health care equivalent of
318. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (listing
“general acceptance” as one criteria courts should consider in determining whether
proposed scientific testimony is valid).
319. See POST, supra note 43, at 56–57 (describing how courts might use
“‘established’ scientific discipline” to determine that astrological advice and
homeopathic medicine do not require First Amendment protection).
320. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 443–44
(1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (summarizing the Court’s history of
commercial speech jurisprudence).
321. Cf. Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012) (defining
rational basis review in the equal protection setting).
322. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2736 (2011) (explaining
that the State possesses the authority and power to protect children from harm).
323. See supra notes 194–208 and accompanying text for a discussion of the harms
of conversion therapy.
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false and misleading commercial speechquackery. Therefore, for
the same reasons false and misleading commercial speech is excluded
from First Amendment protection, quackery should be excluded
from such protection. This approach provides a better balance
between protecting the First Amendment rights of providers as
speakers (and therefore patients as listeners) with the right of States
to use their police powers to protect citizens from harm.
California’s attempt at banning conversion therapy for minors with
SB 1172 provides a case to demonstrate the benefits of this approach.
Under traditional strict scrutiny, SB 1172 would likely be ruled
unconstitutional if viewed as a restriction on speech. If SB 1172 was
ruled unconstitutional, mental health providers would be allowed to
continue to provide conversion therapy and harm patients. Under
the proposed single-prong approach, SB 1172 would be upheld as
constitutional, thereby preventing these harms.
The approach articulated here fits within the broader scheme of
First Amendment jurisprudence. First Amendment protection of
political speech serves to protect the speaker in the marketplace of
ideas, where society’s interest is in making sure all voices are heard.324
Commercial speech andas this Comment argueshealth care
providers’ speech are permissibly regulated under the First
Amendment in order to protect the listener.325 This protection serves
the societal interest in health care: finding the “truth” in diagnosis
and treatment for the individual patient while preventing quackery
from harming patients.

324. See POST, supra note 43, at 24 (noting that the First Amendment is meant to
protect the autonomy of the speaker in public discourse).
325. See id. (arguing for the government’s role in properly adjudicating and
legislating First Amendment issues to protect both the speaker and the targeted).

